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Helen Dale's avatar

In the oughts and tens - roughly the period 2005-2012 - I was involved with organised skepticism and atheism. I went to conferences, wrote articles for skeptical publications, and recall not only the New Atheists but the emergence of Atheism +.

I'm grateful that my involvement was largely contained to the skeptical side of things, because the atheists seemed, at least occasionally, to be quite alarming people. Sam Harris's confidence that he had "solved" Hume's "is-ought" problem struck me as hubristic in the extreme.

The Hume of whom I speak is, of course, David, the great Scottish Enlightenment philosopher and historian, and his “problem” runs like so: it’s impossible to infer a moral claim (what ought to be) from a scientific fact (what is). The distinction between facts and values—between “is” and “ought”—is so routinely collapsed in public debate that it’s necessary to provide an illustration of the problem. Consider the following argument:

1. Human beings reproduce by having children (fact).

2. Only women with wombs are capable of bearing children (fact).

3. Jane has a womb (fact).

4. Therefore, Jane ought to have children (value).

A large part of Harris's hubris has roots in the fact that he engages only with philosophical arguments about the is-ought problem. Philosophy is a relatively weak academic discipline, in part because it almost never engages with anything real.

The people who have to use is-ought thinking on at least a weekly basis and often a daily one are lawyers, especially lawyers in the Attorney-General's department/ministry, but often those of us in the courts have to call on it, too. Harris never engages, at any point, with the legal profession.

This, to me, was a serious and important "tell".

The object of politics—and the province of elected politicians and their senior advisers and senior civil servants, to the exclusion of all others, including scientists—is to make ethical choices on policy where reasonable people can (and do) disagree. This disagreement is usually expressed in the form of elections and referendums. The policy is usually expressed in the form of validly enacted law.

Of course, science can clarify the nature of the choices facing us. Environmental science, for example, tells us that solid fuels result in more local deaths from particulates than result from other energy sources. Meanwhile, economics tells us the clearing price of solid fuels is often much lower than alternatives. That introduces the question of how far the state’s legitimate interest in public health extends when intervening in markets. The welfare good of cheap energy, especially for the poor, must be balanced against the public health risks of solid fuels.

Here, science can introduce honesty to moral choices: it becomes more difficult to call up ideological abstractions (free markets, equality, social justice) or other heuristics on which we rely in the absence of complete data.

However, it is rarely the case that scientific knowledge can be combined with a widely accepted moral principle to produce a single, uncontested policy prescription followed by legislation. And it is the tendency to undervalue the moral heavy lifting of politicians and civil servants—to assume if only facts were clear and proven, playground morals would show us the way—that leads scientists to try to dodge around the is-ought problem.

Often scientists do not appreciate that as soon as they make policy prescriptions—thereby entering the world of “oughts”—an ethical claim is in play, a claim as value‐​laden as any made by a Christian or Muslim about, say, the wrongness of homosexuality, or by a feminist about fighting patriarchy even in developed countries, or a vegetarian about the cruelty of eating meat. That the scientist knows a truth about the world, an “is,” that the monotheist, feminist, or vegetarian likely doesn’t is irrelevant. Moral claims have to be undergirded with moral reasoning.

The proper role for doctors (say) is to give advice within the confines of their field, and the proper role for legislators and policy wonks is to accept that advice and make one of a range of ethical choices based on it. You can do both of course: it’s just that a doctor who wants to decide on law also needs to be a politician, and he needs to be good at it. And ditto for everyone else, really.

I’m happy putting anyone into office: actors, scientists, businesspeople, escorts, whatever. As long as they’re good at the task we give to politics alone, which is ethical reckoning. Politics is the art of telling other people how to live and getting away with it because the instructions are of a type to which we have freely consented at the ballot box.

Sam Harris's inability to understand this (something taught to first year lawyers throughout the UK & British Commonwealth as part of a subject called "legal method") is what has lead directly to the "corpses of children in the basement" comment. It's evidence of someone who is morally stunted.

When I was working as a civil servant the first time around (in 2012, in the Office of the Solicitor to the Scottish Parliament), my legal colleagues used to describe Harris as "the stupid person's idea of a smart person". We'd all titter at this, then get back to work.

I'm now reasonably satisfied that he is something rather darker than that.

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Aarati Martino's avatar

Yes I've seen this happen a couple of times in my life now. A great figure whom I respect espouses an argument for X as a principle, sometimes their whole research program is based on it. Then later they make an argument about a specific thing that is the result of believing not-X.

I just shrug my shoulders and chalk it up to being human. If we were perfectly logical beings how boring would that be? :)

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